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COMMENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY-INDEMNITY LEGISLATION-ANDERSON AMEND-

MENTS TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY AcT OF 1954-The Anderson
Amendments1 were enacted to encourage private industry to enter
the atomic energy field by removing the risk of excessive liabilitfl
for a major nuclear reactor disaster.3 Such a disaster could result
in liability far in excess of available insurance coverage.4 The
solution provided by the new legislation has three aspects: (1)
After private financial protection, geared to the amount of available insurance, is obtained by a person licensed by the Atomic
Energy Commission,5 (2) the Commission will execute an agreement6 to indemnify (not insure) the licensee and "any other
person who may be liable for public liability" to the extent of
$500 million. (3) When claims exceed this amount the fund is
distributed pro rata among claimants, a reserve being set aside
for claims arising from latent injuries. After the $500 million has
thus been exhausted, no further recovery is possible, for the act
cuts off the liability of the licensee at this point. 7
The adoption of an indemnity rather than an insurance8
approach to this problem has at least three important effects. The
first of these is that substantive problems of liability are unaffected
and thus left to the various determinations of state courts.9 This
1 P.L. 85-256, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Sept. 2, 1957), 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp.
1957) §2210, amending the Atomic '.Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV, 1957) §§2011 to 2281. Section references ·herein are to the 1954 act, as amended. See
71 HARV. L. REV. 750 (1958).
2 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. I (1957).
3 AEC, TWENTY-SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1957). Some companies have flatly
stated that they will not put their costly reactors into operation until adequate protection is available. See, e.g., 103 CoNG. REc. 9560 Guly 1, 1957).
4 Conceivable damages from the worst possible disaster have been estimated at from
$200 million to S7 billion, including 3400 fatalities and injuries to 43,000 or more. 103
CONG. REc. 9560 Guly 1, 1957); and Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 53 (1956). The maximum amount
of private insurance presently available from both .the stock and mutual pools is about
S60 million. Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard," 60 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 913 at 916 et seq. (1957). T•his figure is about four times the maximum coverage
for a single risk ever before available. AEC TWENTY-SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REI'ORT 44
(1957).
5 Section I 70(a). See notes 29 and 30 infra.
6 Section 170(c).
7 Section 170(e).
8 This is contrasted with re-insurance or a compensation scheme. See ATOMIC INDUS·
TRIAL FORUM, !NC., FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC HAZARDS 45, 47 (1957).
9 For analysis of the substantive problems associated with nuclear risks, see Cable
and Early, "Torts and the Atom: The Problem of Insurance," 45 KY. L. J. 3 (1956);
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result does not necessarily follow from the decision to use an
indemnity plan, as is demonstrated by the procedure employed
on the European continent where indemnity is accompanied by
the imposition of strict liability.10 It may well be, however, that
state courts will impose liability without fault in the event of a
nuclear reactor disaster, but this is not certain and holdings might
vary.11 Moreover, the expensive problems of duplicative litigation
are evident in the context of a burn-up that spreads radioactive
material over a multi-state area, particularly if the law of the
state where the injury occurs is applied, as appears likely under
existing conflicts rules.12 These costs of litigation or settlement
will be paid out of the limited funds available to meet liability
claims with the necessary result that whenever claims reach the
limit on aggregate liability, whatever is consumed in the process
of litigation must reduce the amount available to compensate
injured persons.
A second impact of the indemnity approach is that Congress
has kept the government out of the insurance business, a decision
which avoids both practical13 and political problems.14 That the
present solution cannot appropriately be characterized as insurance is rather clear, for insurance connotes a scheme whereby

Becker and Huard, "Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry," 44 GEO. L. J. 58
(1955); ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, !NC., FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC liAzARDs
(1957); Mitchel, "Some Administrative and Legal Problems Related to the ·widespread
Use of High Level Radiation Sources," THE EcoNOMIC.S OF NUCLEAR PoWER 397 (1957).
It is quite likely that an entrepreneur will be exposed to liability without fault for
engaging in an extrahazardous activity. PROSSER, TORTS 336 (1955), and sources cited
above. Even under a test of fault the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter may, in effect, impose
strict liability. Liability might also be founded on a theory of nuisance. Freedman,
"Nuisance, Ultrahazardous Activities, and the Atomic Reactor," 30 TEMP. L. Q. 77 (1957).
The fact that the activity is being carried on pursuant to a federal license may avert
strict liability [PROSSER, TORTS 343-344 (1955)], and certain other defenses, e.g., proximate
causation, contributory negligence and assumed risk might protect the operator. Suppliers of parts might be held liable for furnishing a dangerous instrumentality. Moran
v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., (3d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 908. In regard to liability
of government contractors, see 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS §29.4, p. 1618 (1956).
10 See Belser, "The Present Position of Reactor Owners in Europe in Respect to
Third Party Liability and Insurance," paper presented to the Atomic Industrial Forum,
N.Y., Oct. 30, 1957; comment, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1957).
11 See note 9 supra.
12 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., §94 (1949). Defendants may be sued whereever they can be served with process, subject to forum non conveniens considerations, id.
at §11.
13 The process of setting up additional governmental machinery to conduct insurance
business would be expensive and unnecessary. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 169 (1956).
14 This is anathema to the insurance industry, id. at 168, 169.
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premiums are collected on an actuarial basis to accumulate a
reserve out of which claims may be paid. The modest fee 111 imposed for the government indemnity is intended only to defray
administrative costs and will not be used to accumulate any reserve.16 Moreover, the accumulation of such a reserve adequate
to cover all nuclear risks would make premium costs prohibitive.17
The third consideration, which would probably also apply
even had an insurance plan been adopted, 18 is that Congress can
nullify the indemnity by withdrawing its consent to be sued.
While the indemnity agreements are contractual and Congress
cannot repudiate its contractual obligations under the Fifth
Amendment, 19 this limitation is not traversed when Congress
simply refuses its consent to be sued.20 Moreover, the indemnity
is in the nature of a gratuity which Congress is always free to
repudiate. 21 The significance of this consideration lies in the expectation that private insurance organizations will have accumulated sufficient experience and reserves in the next ten years to
assume the entire burden of carrying nuclear risks,22 and that
Congress may therefore wish to withdraw from this area. It was
for this reason that the authority of the Commission to enter indemnification agreements expires on August 1, 1967, although
no limit is imposed on the duration of agreements23 it may make
before that time. Since all persons covered by the act remain
primarily liable, the effect of withdrawing the indemnity would
be at least to expose them to the additional $500 million liability
which the government would otherwise have paid. It appears that
lCSSection 170(£) authorizes ,the Commission to collect a fee of $30 per year per 1000
kilowatts of thermal energy capacity for commercial licensees, and less in the Commission's discretion (based on prescribed criteria), no fee to be less than $100 per year.
16 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity
and Reactor Safety, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 14 (1956).
17 Ibid. The yearly premium for the maximum coverage currently available under
both pools is about $260,000. Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard,"
60 PUB. Um.. FORT. 913 at 922 (1957).
18 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
19 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
20 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), holding repeal of legislation under
which individuals paid premiums to ithe government for war risk insurance could not
validly repudiate such contract rights, but that Congress could nevertheless refuse to be
sued on such claims.
21 Brown, "Vested Rights and the Portal to Portal Act," 46 MICH. L. REv. 723 at
736 (1948). But cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), which distinguished
pensions from insurance because an agreement of the parties is not involved.
22 Hearings Before .the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity,
84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 86 (1956).
28 Section 170(c).
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Congress could abolish even this limitation and restore full
liability if it chose.24
In light of these basic considerations the balance of this comment will attempt to pose some of the problems facing the Atomic
Energy Commission, nuclear entrepreneurs, and the public under
the provisions of the new law.

I. Coverage: Persons Indemnified
The act's coverage is designed to supplement, rather than provide an alternative to private insurance.25 This reflects a policy of
limiting coverage to cases where private insurance is unable to
furnish protection in adequate amounts, and, generally,2is only
those who have obtained all the private insurance available can
make indemnity agreements. The extent to which reliance is
placed on private coverage is illustrated by the language of section 170(c) providing that the indemnity shall be for liability
"in excess of the level of financial protection required." The
committee report interprets this to mean that the government
will not have to pay until claims exceed this amount even if the
insurance company is not liable because of a "loophole" in its
policy.27 This eventuality is unlikely, however, since the statute
and the private policies have been drafted to track each other as
closely as possible,28 so that generally speaking what is covered by
one is also covered by the other. It does not take care of the problem presented by a breach of the insurance contract such as by
failure to pay premiums.
In addition to obtaining the necessary private financial protection, a person must make an indemnity agreement before he
is covered by the act, although, as ·will be indicated below, the
agreement covers persons other than the indemnitee. The question who can make such agreements therefore becomes important.
While the act requires an agreement of all facilities licensees,2Q
24 CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF
25 Hearings Before •the Joint

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1093 (1952).
Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity,

84th Cong., 2d sess., p. I (1956).
26 Section 170(b) authorizes the Commission to require a lesser amount. See below,
"III. Financial Protection Required."
27 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 21 (1957).
28 Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard," 60 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
913 at 918 (1957); S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 16, 17 (1957).
29 These are licenses issued pursuant to §§103 and 104, authorizing the ownership
and operation of facilities for the production or utilization of special nuclear materials
and §185 which authorizes construction of such a facility.
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the Commission has the discretion to decide whether materials
licensees30 must make agreements.31 If it decides that they need
not, then they will normally31a not be covered. Indemnity agreements are also available to AEC contractors whose activities involve the risk of a substantial nuclear incident,32 but the contractors, unlike licensees, are not required to furnish financial
protection.33 There are two basic reasons for this distinction. In
the first place, it has been the practice of the Commission all
along to make indemnity agreements with its contractors for
nuclear risks.84 Secondly, the government would ultimately have
to bear the cost of any insurance which it required its contractors
to carry. Against this saving in government expense, however,
must be balanced the better protection given the public by private liability insurance than by the old government indemnity contracts; for the private insurance policies do not except negligence
or bad faith of the contractor from policy coverage as do the existing AEC indemnity contracts.35 Moreover, even when a contractor
indemnified under the old arrangement chooses to make the $500
million indemnity agreement, total coverage is less than if he
had private insurance. This follows because his liability in all
cases is limited to $500 million plus "the amount of financial
protection required of the . . . contractor."86 But since the old
80 Licenses issued pursuant to §§53, 63 and 81, authorizing the possession and use
of special nuclear, source and by-product material.
31 Production, §ll(s), and utilization, §ll(y), facilities are defined .to include any
equipment or device (excepting atomic weapons) capable of producing or using special
nuclear material in such quantity or manner as to affect the health and safety of the
public. Theoretically, then, mere materials licensees are less likely to pose a threat of
catastrophic damage. The Commission is therefore given discretion in such cases so that
financial protection will be required only when needed. However, no amount of byproduct material will automatically require a facilities license, so the Commission has
complete discretion in this situation.
Sla See text following note 39 infra.
32 The term "substantial" is a translation of the distinction between facility and
materials licensees, i.e., .to restrict coverage to the situations where there is likely to be
large potential for damage. 103 CONG. REc. 9562 Guly I, 1957).
83 The Commission is authorized to require financial protection but has decided
not to do so. BNA, ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:29 (1958). The Commission has, nevertheless,
offered the indemnity to its contractors, ibid.
34 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity,
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 76-85 (1956). Prior to the 1957 amendments the only financial
qualifications the AEC required of its licensees under §182 was the ability to meet the
normal costs of operating the facility and paying for materials. Hearings Before the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p.
107 (1956), IO C.F.R. 50.33 (Supp. 1957).
85 Hearings -Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity,
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 76-85 (1956).
86 Section I 70(e).
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indemnity contracts do not appear to be "financial protection required" (since by hypothesis no financial protection is required
of contractors) liability is limited to $500 million. This is less
than coverage of the smallest licensee, since the $500 million is
added to whatever financial protection the licensee furnishes. 37
The failure of the act to make clear the relationship between the
two indemnities will undoubtedly raise other problems in the
future.
As was previously. suggested, an agreement once made covers
many persons other than the indemnitee. The act provides that
the AEC will contract to indemnify its licensees "and any other
persons who may be liable."38 This provision was urged by contractors and suppliers who might be liable in connection with a
nuclear incident and was therefore intended primarily to cover
such cases as the manufacturer of a defective rea,ctor part.39 The
provision could also apply to a materials licensee who decided not
to make an indemnity agreement himself. The Senate Report
indicates, however, that the language also covers trespassers (e.g.,
an airplane which crashes into the reactor causing a nuclear incident) and even saboteurs, so long as the sabotage does not constitute an act of war. 40 The reason given for including such
persons is the desirability of protecting the public in these circumstances; and policy arguments can be made for covering the
unfortunate owner of the airplane. It may nevertheless be questioned whether, in protecting the public against the deeds of a
malicious trespasser, it is also necessary to indemnify that wrongdoer and limit his liability. The question becomes particularly
pertinent when it is realized that innocent injured third parties
are not protected by the act at all, because of the inherent limitations of the indemnity approach, if no liability for an incident
is found. Failure to cover the no-liability case is explained by its
considerable improbability and the expectation that Congress
would act ad hoc in such a situation. (It should be noted here
that the required private insurance must be broad enough to

37 The AEC temporary regulation, 10 C.F,R. §140.11 (Supp. 1957), requires each
licensee (excepting materials licensees) to have and maintain financial protection for
each nuclear reactor in the amount of $150,000 per 1000 kilowatts of thermal energy
capacity authorized in the license, provided that no reactor shall have less than $250,000.
38 Sections 170(c), ll(r).
39 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity,
84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 116 (1956).
40 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 17 (1957).

758

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

cover liability of all the "persons who may be liable," discussed
above, before the Commission will permit an indemnity agreement to be made.)
Special coverage problems relating to the traditional immunity from suit of local governmental bodies and the federal
government should be raised at this point. As to the former,
the act authorizes the Commission to require waiver of such immunity as a condition to granting a license to operate a reactor. 41
(As a licensee, of course, the local body must secure private financial protection and execute an indemnity agreement.) Several
dif6.culties42 can merely be mentioned in this regard, viz., whether immunity exists at all-raising the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions; 43 whether the particular body
has sufficient legislative and constitutional authority to waive it,
and, if so, whether such a requirement on the part of the Commission constitutes an unconstitutional condition.44
As to the United States, the committee hearings indicate a
general assumption that the Federal Government would not become liable.45 The possibility does arise, however, under the Federal Tort Claims Act46 which permits suit in tort cases where a
private person under the same circumstances would be liable.
There are a number of exceptions to this, the most relevant to
the present problem being " ... an act or omission of an employee
of the Government . . . in execution of a statute or regulation . . . based upon the exercise or performance or failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . whether
or not the discretion involved be abused. " 47 This limitation received a broad construction in Dalehite v. United States,48 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that decisions relating to the technical conditions under which certain fertilizer
was packaged involved governmental discretion. A subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court, however, has given greater recog-

41 Section 170(a). The provision is not mandatory.
The Commission is now studying these problems, BNA, ATOMIC INDUSTRY
REP. 3:31 (1957).
43 CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 107-108 (1952).
44 See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. I (1910); Frost 8: Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
45 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity,
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 73, 74 (1956).
46 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1346, 2671 to 2680.
47 Id., §1346(a).
48 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
42
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nition to the distinction between the use of governmental discretion to undertake a given activity -and the relatively mechanical
aspects of carrying it out.49 Two recent district court decisions
have evidenced a conflicting approach as to how far the exercise
of discretion extends in the process of testing atomic weapons. 50
These cases indicate generally that if, e.g., the alleged negligence
of a federal employee is in the determination of safety standards,
rather than their proper administration, the government will
escape liability.
Should the government be found liable, however, its relationship to the Anderson Amendment is somewhat unclear. As the
operator of a reactor, the government can probably be presumed
not to have made an agreement with itself, so that its liability is
not limited. If its liability is in connection with another's agreement (an Air Force plane crashes into a covered reactor) the
liability limitation might apply. The question would turn on
whether the government is a "person(s)" within the provision
of section 170(e) that the "aggregate liability for a single nuclear
incident of persons indemnified . . . shall not exceed the sum of
$500,000,000 ...."

II. Protection: Persons Entitled To Recover
While the act's protection of the public is broad, it is not unlimited. Section 17 0(c) provides that a "contract of indemnity
shall cover public liability arising out of or in connection with
the licensed activity." This language obviously includes any incident which occurs on the site of the licensed activity, and the
Committee Report specifically includes any mishap that may
arise while radioactive materials are being transported to or from
that site. 51 Does the phrase "in connection with the licensed
activity" embrace an incident which occurs at the plant of the
fuel elements fabricator or re-processor? While such an inclusion
49 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); 5 J. PUB. L. 258 (1957).
cm Bulloch v. United States, (D.C. Utah 1956) 145 F. Supp. 824, noted in 35 TEXAS
L. REV. 590 (1957); and Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, (S.D. Cal. 1955) 135 F. Supp.
651, noted in 5 J. PUB. L. 258 (1956). Both cases denied recovery, but the latter on
grounds that the question of taking certain precautions prior to testing involved govern•
mental discretion, while the former insisted that actual carrying out of the tests is
ministerial and requires the exercise of due care, recovery being denied for failure to
prove causation. The Bartholomae case also rejected a theory that the damage involved
a taking which requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the essence of the
claim being in tort.
51 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 18 (1957).

760

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

appears reasonable, can the language be further extended to cover
an accident occurring in one of these independent plants arising
out of work done for another customer (which has no indemnity
agreement) but which is aggravated by fissionable materials on
hand for use in the indemnified reactor? To state such questions is
to emphasize that they are a matter of degree and must be determined on their facts as they arise.
Another limitation on the act's protection is the geographic
requirement that the nuclear. incident must occur "within the
United States."52 This clearly excludes any nuclear incident
abroad, whether it caused injury within the United States or
liability to a United States citizen, e.g., an exporter.53 The latter
situation is particularly important in view of the fact that the
first real demand for reactors will be in other countries, rather
than in the United States with its relative abundance of fossil
fuels. 54 Indemnity legislation is probably not the best answer to
this problem which the Joint Committee preferred to handle
through international agreements, 55 but dependence on individual agreements following diplomatic negotiation is not conducive
to the most rapid development of a market for American built
reactors.
Less clear is the case of an incident occurring within the
United States which causes damage abroad (e.g., Canada or
Mexico) with resulting liability of the indemnitee. The Committee Report indicates that such a case would not be covered, grouping it with the foregoing situations as problems that "will require
further investigation by the Congress at that time." 56 Such an
interpretation is difficult to square with the language of the act
which simply states that the "nuclear incident" must be within
the United States.57 The Report is careful to point out in another
connection that the site of a nuclear incident is "that event at
the site of the ... activity . . . rather than the site where the damage may perhaps be caused." 58 Moreover, the act states that in-

52 Section
53 S. Rep.

170(0).
296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957).
54 Wit, "Some International Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 LAw AND
CONTEM. PROB. 148 (1956).
55 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity
and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 13, 14 (1957); ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC.,
FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC liAzARDs 60, 61 (1957).
56 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957).
57 Section ll(o).
58 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957).
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demnitees are to be indemnified for "any legal liability arising
out of, or resulting from, a nuclear incident," 59 although the
Report indicates that "any" was used only to remove all time
restrictions on claims. 60 The desirability of using this broad word
for so narrow a purpose can be questioned, and the construction
of the section will ultimately turn on whether a court will let
the legislative history control the relatively plain meaning of the
statute.61
The act is quite liberal in covering all kinds of damage, 62 and
it should be noted that protection is not confined to losses for
which legal liability is found. That is, even property owned by
one held liable in connection with an incident, if located off the
site of the reactor, is protected provided it is also covered by the
financial protection furnished by the licensee. 63 This is important, for the risk of loss caused by a nuclear calamity is excluded
from all insurance policies save those covering the nuclear activity
itself. 64 Nuclear liability policies, however, cover the operator's
off-site property and the governmental indemnity adds needed
depth to his protection. Since all other persons are covered by the
government indemnity as well as the operator's financial protection, if the operator's off-site property were not included, lie
would be protected to a lesser extent than everyone else with
respect to off-site· property.65 This inclusion in the act was prompted by the plight of colleges operating small research reactors in
proximity to the main campus, 66 although the act's language is
not confined to the college reactor situation. It covers the commercial operator in the same manner, no differentiation being
made because the non-nuclear insurance problem is the same.
In addition to actual present damage, indemnity will also be
paid on claims for the loss of use of property. 67 This could mean,

59 Section ll(u). Emphasis added.
60 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957).
61 Cf. generally ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC.,

FINANCIAL PROTECI1ON AGAINST
ATOMIC HAzARDs 61 (1957).
62 Section ll(o).
63 Sections ll(u), 170(c).
64 In order to avoid pyramiding of claims, the insurance organizations have excluded
nuclear risks from all policies except those covering on-site personnel and property and
liability, the latter being intended to cover the risks excluded from all the other policies.
Hence, the manner in which the federal indemnity is drawn, S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong.,
1st sess., p. I 7 (1957).
65 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 18 (1957).
66Ibid.
61 Section ll(o).
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in the event total damages exceed the aggregate limit on liability
so as to require apportionment, that lost profits of the operator
due to destruction of his off-site property would be allowed to
dilute the personal injury claims of innocent third parties. The
wisdom of including such relatively speculative damages when a
ceiling is imposed on total liability appears questionable in view
of the absence of any priority scheme in the act.
Finally, three relatively narrow exceptions to the kind of
losses covered by the act should be noted: "claims arising out of
an act of war," damage to property of persons indemnified which
"is located at the site of and used in connection with the activity
where the nuclear incident occurs," and "claims under State or
Federal Workmen's Compensation Acts of employees of persons
indemnified who are employed at the site of and in connection
with activity where · the nuclear incident occurs." 68 The reason
for the first exception is plain, and the latter two were established
because separate insurance policies adequately cover such losses. 69
While the phrase in these latter two exceptions, "in connection
with the activity," might cause interpretative problems, when
construed in the light of the reason for the exceptions, persons
not covered by separate insurance are probably covered by the
act.

III. Financial Protection Required
Although, as has already been observed, the coverage of the
act extends to all persons who may incur liability in connection
with a nuclear incident, the only persons who pay for this benefit
are the licensee (and possibly a contractor) with whom the indemnity agreement is executed and the government; the others
pay nothing. The amount of financial protection required of these
licensees is the "amount of liability insurance available from private sources except that the Commission may require a lesser
amount" taking into consideration such factors as (1) the cost
and terms of private insurance, (2) the type, size and location of
the licensed activity and other factors pertaining to the hazard,
and (3) the nature and purpose of the licensed activity.70 These
exceptions were allowed to permit the Commission to consider
the degree of hazard and the economics of an activity, and to
68 Section
69 S. Rep.

ll(u).
296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. I 7, 18 (1957); Stanley and Simmons, "Financial
Protection for the Atomic Energy Industry," 45 GEO. L. J. 587 at 589, 590 (1957).
70 S.ection I70(b).
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provide a possible inducement for non-profit research reactors
by requiring little private protection. 71
However, in the case of facilities "designed for producing substantial amounts of electricity and having a rated capacity of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more, the amount of financial protection required shall be the maximum amount available from private sources." 72 If private insurance should become available in
substantially greater amounts, premium charges could become so
burdensome that it would be financially impossible to operate
such a reactor. Such circumstances would result in the same general kind of problem that the indemnity legislation was designed
to overcome in the first place, i.e., a financial barrier to private
atomic enterprise development associated with the contingency of
liability to third parties.73 The provision in question appears to
represent a feeling that the potentially most dangerous facilities
should, in order to maximize public protection, be given the
least financial incentives.74 The appropriateness of the above
limitation to achieve that policy seems dubious, however, since
the inhibiting factor is geared to the amount of insurance available rather than the extent of the hazard. To illustrate, if the
amount of insurance available remains limited, a reactor could be
profitably operated on the outskirts of New York City, while if an
unlimited amount of insurance should ultimately become available, it would become unprofitable to operate a reactor even in
a sparsely settled area because of the large premium outlay.
Although the financial protection required of licensees is
measured in terms of available insurance, this protection may be
furnished by "private insurance, private contractual indemnities,
self insurance, other proof of financial responsibility, or a combination of such measures." 75 Any plan that involves reliance on
the licensee's own assets raises a number of troublesome problems.
A preliminary consideration, which the AEC must take into
account in determining the adequacy of such protection, is the
71 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 19 (1957).
72Section 170(b).
78 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity,
84th Cong., 2d s=., pp. 1-3 (1956).
74103 CONG. REc. 9554-9555 (July 1, 1957). Representative Cole stated: "The Joint
Committee thinks it is quite proper that these large reactors operators should be required
as a matter of law to get the maximum amount of insurance that is available, whether
it is $20 million or •.• $200 million. They must go out and buy and pay out of their
own resources the coverage in the greatest amount that is available to them." Id. at 9563.
75 Section 170(b).

764

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

possible effect of a nuclear incident on these assets. The incident
might cause extensive damage to off-site property that may not
be compensated in full if claims exceed the aggregate limit on
liability, and which the licensee itself would have to make good
from undamaged assets. Moreover, many companies rely on their
assets to meet workmen's compensation claims, and the consequences of a nuclear incident could be severe in this regard. 76
Other problems can be suggested. Since, as previously indicated, private financial protection must cover everyone who might
become liable, the Commission must decide how the licensee or
contractor can show coverage of its suppliers, to say nothing of
possible trespassers. This problem becomes extraordinarily complex when it is realized that such trespassers, who must be covered by indemnitee's financial protection, may also be liable to
the indemnitee.77

IV. Limitation on Liability
Although repeatedly urged to recommend an open end indemnity, the Joint Committee did not do so for two major reasons. In the first place, an unlimited commitment of public funds
would have been extremely difficult to get through Congress,78
which undoubtedly had a considerable impact on the second consideration, viz., that Congress is generally disposed to wait and
deal with any disaster situation on an ad hoc basis. This philosophy is reflected in the frequently iterated suggestion that Congress
can appropriate additional funds should the ceiling on liability
be reached. 79 While adopting the aggregate limitation, Congress
rejected a ceiling on individual claims, such as was employed in
connection with the Texas City disaster.80 Such a limitation might
76 See remarks of Sen. Anderson, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 22, 23 (1957).
77 BNA, ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 3:371 (1957).
78 "In suggesting $500 million, I was trying ,to see if we could not get some figure
which would not frighten the country or the Congress to death and still solve the problem which the producers of parts face, and which the fabricator of the entire reactor
faces, and which the operator of that reactor would eventually face once he puts it in
operation." Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic :Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 53 (1956).
·
79 103 CONG. REc. 13724 (Aug. 16, 1957).
so Fertilizer being shipped overseas by the Federal Government caught fire and exploded while being loaded, causing enormous loss of life and property in Texas City.
The facts are set forth .in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which held that
the Federal Tort Claims Act did not permit suit against the government under the
circumstances. Congress subsequently appropriated funds for the compensation of claimants, with a $25,000 ceiling on individual claims, on August 10, 1955. 69 Stat. 707, c. 864.
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deprive a few seriously injured plaintiffs of adequate compensation, whereas Congress can benefit the larger numbers affected by
the aggregate ceiling with an additional appropriation.
Since the act serves to limit recovery on judgments validly obtained under state law, its constitutionality under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment must be considered. Courts have
dealt with both state and federal cases involving limitations on
liability and have frequently upheld such legislation by finding
that a valuable right was granted in return for the right given
up. Thus, in the federal area the Warsaw Convention placing an
upper limit on recovery in air disasters has been upheld since
plaintiff need no longer prove negligence. 81 Similarly the United
States Supreme Court has upheld state workmen's compensation
statutes limiting recovery since the employer was made absolutely
liable.82 The Anderson Amendment could be brought within
the principle of these cases by arguing that in return for the limitation on defendant's liability, Congress has substituted a $500
million plus fund, which can reasonably be assumed to be larger
than the available asset pool of most reactor operators, or at least
a fair substitute therefor. Moreover, to the extent that assumption is correct, the denial of due process becomes illusory.
An even larger number of cases, however, can be found where
liability was limited without any apparent grant of substitute
rights. In the federal area the liability of shipowners has been
limited under the admiralty power; 83 liability is constitutionally
cut off in the Bankruptcy Act; 84 and Congress has abolished retroactively causes of action for portal-to-portal pay within the
limits of due process, although that case is distinguishable because the causes also rested on rights that existed only by virtue
of a federal statute. 85 The Supreme Court's theory in such cases
appears to be that the limitation was a reasonable and appropriate
exercise of substantive powers granted Congress; 86 it cannot be
81 Warsaw Convention on International Air Transportation, 49 Stat. 3019 (eff. Oct.
29, 1934). Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, (D.C. N.J. 1957) 152 F. Supp. 486. See Pickens,
"Actions Arising Out of Airplane -Mishaps," 42 IowA L. REv. 479 at 503-507 (1957).
82New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916).
83 U.S. Rev. Stat. §4283 (1875), as amended 46 U.S.C. (1952) §183; In re Garnett, 141
U.S. 1 (1891).
84 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15 (1957).
85 See cases cited in 29 U.S.C.A. (1956) §251. See also, :Brown, "Vested Rights and
the Portal to Portal Act," 46 MICH. L. REv. 723 (1948).
SBSee, e.g., In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1 (1891); Second Employers Liability Cases, 223
U.S. I (1912), where the Court used this argument, inter alia, in sustaining congressional
legislation which enlarged .the liability of interstate carriers.
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doubted that there are substantive powers to justify federal atomic
energy regulation.87
Fourteenth Amendment and state cases also provide fruitful
analogies. The Supreme Court recently dismissed a due process
objection to a California statute limiting recovery in libel suits
against newspapers and radio stations to special damages unless
retraction be demanded and refused, for want of a substantial
federal question.88 State statutes limiting liability for airplane,
accidents have been upheld.89 The generally unquestioned assumption that corporate liability is limited is not wholly irrelevant. The sweep of these cases cutting across many substantive
areas seems rather conclusively to indicate that the act will be
upheld.
V. Problems of Administration
The act wisely provides that "in administering the provisions
of this section, the Commission shall use, to the maximum extent practicable, the facilities and services of private insurance
organizations." 90 These organizations, of course, will be reimbursed for their services, such expenses being charged to the fund:
This provision has the practical advantage of avoiding needless
duplication of machinery and may also serve to alleviate problems in the application of section l 70(h). That section provides
that "when the Commission makes a determination that the United
States will probably be required to make indemnity payments ...
[it] shall collaborate with any person indemnified and may approve the payment of any claim under the agreement for indemnification, appear through the Attorney General on behalf of the
per~on indemnified, take charge of such action, and settle or de-

87 F.step, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Atomic
Energy Activities," 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 333 (1954).
ss Jefferson v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 344 U.S. 803, rehearing den. 344 U.S. 882
(1952). The Supreme Court also upheld Minnesota mortgage moratorium legislation
as a reasonable exercise of the police ,power in Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED S:rATES OF AMERICA
360 (1952). State courts have gone both ways on the constitutionality of such statutes;
but where the statutes have been stricken down, a state constitutional provision assuring
a remedy for libel has also been involved. California and other states have found neither
that type provision nor the Fourteenth Amendment inconsistent with the Jegislation. See
Werner v. Southern California etc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. (2d) 121, 216 P. (2d) 825 (1950),
and annotation in 13 ALR. (2d) 277 (1952); 36 ORE. L. R.Ev. 70 (1956).
89 Pickens, "Actions Arising Out of Airplane Mishaps," 42 IowA L. R.Ev. 479 at 486,
487 (1957).
90 Section 170(g).
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fend any such action." (Emphasis added.) Since the "agreement
for indemnification" does not appear to include the financial
protection furnished by the licensee, 91 it is not clear at just what
point claims may be administered by the Commission as opposed
to the private insurer.92 This is unfortunate for whenever damages reach the point where both private and government indemnities are needed, no useful purpose is served by distinguishing
which source is paying a particular claim. As indicated earlier in this paragraph, to the extent the commission utilizes the
private insurer as its agent in handling claims under section
l 70(g), this problem may be circumvented.
More serious problems will arise should apportionment of
claims become necessary. While the Texas City disaster provided
some useful experience in this area, it can hardly serve as precedent for administration of the act. There Congress simply appointed the Secretary of the Army to administer payments and
imposed a ceiling of $25,000 on individual claims.93 This procedure was facilitated by the fact that the funds were not in discharge of any legal obligation on the part of the government,
that question already having been resolved in the government's
favor. 94 In addition, Congress had only to deal with a single geographically isolated disaster, the specific facts of which were readily available. Thus Congress did not have to rely on subsequent
fact findings to determine whether payments need be limited.
Section 170(e) of the.act deals with these problems and provides as follows:
"The Commission or any person indemnified may apply
to the appropriate district court of the United States having
venue in bankruptcy matters over the location of the nuclear
incident, and upon a showing that the public liability from a
single nuclear incident will probably exceed the limit of
liability ... , shall be entitled to such orders as may be appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of this section,
including an order limiting liability of the persons indemnified, orders staying the payment of claims and the execution
of court judgments, orders permitting partial payments to

g1 Section 170(d) gives the commission discretionary power to require financial protec•
tion in addition to its existing authority to indemnify its contractors.
92 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 750 at 753 (1958).
oa 69 Stat. 707, c. 864, August 10, 1955.
g4 See note 80 supra.
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be made before final determination of the total claims, and
an order setting aside a part of the funds available for possible latent injuries not discovered until a later time." 95
The section sets venue as the site of the nuclear incident, that is,
where the mishap takes place rather than where damage is incurred.96 Individual claimants, however, may sue a defendant in
any state where process may be served and property of the defendant remains subject to attachment.97
Perhaps the most difficult problems raised by the section concern the handling of latent injuries. An estimate of their probable
extent should be included in determining whether total claims
will exceed the limit on liability.98 It is therefore possible that
immediate claims will not be satisfied in full even if they do not
exceed the limit. Once the reserve for latent injuries is set aside,
further difficulties may be expected when the first claims are presented. To what extent can they be satisfied? And how long should
the fund be maintained? The proper disposition of whatever may
remain in the reserve on its termination presents still another
unanswered question. Since the indemnity legislation does not
substantively affect liability, state statutes of limitations are still
a bar; yet the Committee Report indicated that it intended no
time limit on filing claims. 98a Perhaps the peculiar characteristics
of radiation injuries may lead to corresponding adjustments in
this regard. All these considerations indicate that it will make a
difference to claimants whether they are paid out of the funds
available for immediate distribution or out of the reserve, yet
the act provides no time limit within which the first category of
claims must be filed. These many determinations will ultimately
devolve upon the federal district courts.
Section 170(e) of the act suggests as a solution to these problems the use of a device akin to the equity receivership.99 This

95 Section

I 70(e).

96 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong.,
97 At least until and unless

1st sess., p. 22 (1957).
the appropriate federal district cour.t issues an order as

provided in §170(e).
98 The act provides only that a reserve is to be set aside when describing the procedure for apportionment. -In view of the policy of the act not to limit protection by time,
"claims" as that word is used in §170(e) to describe the conditions for a petition for
apportionment should include an estimate of latent injuries.
98a Note 60 supra.
99 Federal district courts are authorized to appoint receivers for property situated
in different districts. 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§754, 959, 1692.
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would require that all suits be brought against a receiver in a
single court. Aside from providing highly desirable uniformity
in the measurement of damages,100 claims could be so co-ordinated
as to enable fair and workable apportionment. In addition, by
eliminating duplicative proof of the facts of a single incident,
depletion of the indemnity fund as a result of the expense of
litigation would be minimized. Moreover, by placing all of defendant's assets under the control of a federal district court and
thereby eliminating the danger of obstructing attachments, the
defendant's business may be maintained as a "going concern."
A Connecticut court employed this device with considerable success in connection with the Ringling Brothers fire of 1944.101
With outstanding claims approximated at $15 million,102 Ringling
Brothers submitted to voluntary receivership. All claims were
determined by arbitration under an agreement by which Ringling Brothers did not contest liability. So enabled to continue
in business, Ringling Brothers paid off its obligations out of
earnings during the next six years.
Arguably, the use of the equity receivership will result in the
additional advantage of a single period of limitations in the administration of all claims connected with a single incident. This
result may be reached on any one of three different theories. The
proceedings being equitable in nature, a court would be justified
in applying the doctrine of !aches and disregarding state statutes of
limitations. Alternatively, regarding jurisdiction as based upon
federal question, resort may be had to a single federal period of
limitation. On the other hand, assuming jurisdiction would have
to be founded upon diversity of citizenship, compelling resort
to state law, traditional conflicts doctrine generally classifies
statutes of limitation as procedural,103 so that the lex fori would
control in all cases. While it is recognized that the advantages of
the equity receivership are somewhat lessened by the appointment of ancillary receivers in other states, it may reasonably be
assumed that nuclear reactors will be separately incorporated and
the defendant's assets located in a single state.

100 Tihe greatest degree of uniformity would be achieved were the proceedings conceived of as equitable in nature. In this situation, ·there would be no requirement of
a jury and all claims would ,be tried before the same judge.
101 Jacobs v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 141 Conn.
86, 103 A. (2d) 805 (1954); 60 YALE L. J. 1417 (1951).
102Ibid.
103 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., 240 (1949).
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Conclusion
The primary purpose of the indemnity amendments, to encourage private enterprise in the atomic energy field by providing
protection from the danger of financial ruin104 accompanying a
nuclear disaster, appears to have been accomplished.105 The legislation is also to be commended for measures designed to prevent
serious accidents106 and in providing greater financial protection
to the public than has heretofore existed. But, the serious shortcomings of the legislation in its present form are not to be overlooked. The limited character of the protection, particularly in
view of failure to adopt a scale of priority, could result in serious
inequities. In addition, the decision not to impose strict liability
in conjunction with the indemnity makes possible unnecessary
litigation at the expense of both indemnitors and claimants. Moreover, the failure to supply adequate administrative machinery is
apt to present real difficulties, particularly in those cases where
apportionment of claims becomes necessary. These problems can
in large measure be alleviated by ad hoc congressional appropriations, and resort to the equity receivership.

Dudley H. Chapman, S.Ed.

104' The philosophy underlying the act has .been described as being to protect industry,
not the public, the latter to be accommodated by ad hoc appropriations. Hearings Before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,
pp. 38, 39 (1956).
105 Donovan, "Insurance Problems Crea.ted by the Peacetime Use of Atomic Energy,''
INS. L. J. 623 (Oct. 1957).
106 Section 29 formally establishes the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
a body which has already exercised its function of making safety recommendations with
regard to specific license applications, on an informal basis. Sec. 170(i) calls for a Commission survey following any nuclear incident that will probably require payments under
the government indemnity to determine its causes, the findings to be made public.

